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Abstract  
 
Current research on antidumping suggests a number of channels through which antidumping 
affects the volume of world trade. This paper uses a structural approach to the gravity model 
framework to evaluate these hypotheses using data on trade volume over the period 1960-2001. 
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 Non-Technical Summary  
 
As with the wave of interest in the "new protection" in the 1970s, we are now observing a new wave of 
concern with a rapid increase in the use of "non-traditional" protectionist instruments. Once again, the 
main culprit is contingent protection (primarily antidumping and countervailing duties, though voluntary 
export restraints---mainly coming from the safeguards process---also figured prominently in the 1970s). 
These forms of protection are "contingent" because they are dependent on a quasi-judicial/bureaucratic 
finding prior to application of the protection. By contrast, traditional protection is "statutory", i.e. it is 
applied in every case, without any such finding.  This is a more useful distinction than the common "tariff 
v. nontariff barrier" distinction since contingent protection is usually included in the latter even though it is 
implemented by tariffs. The main difference is that in the 1970s the main users were industrial countries 
(mainly the US, EU, Canada, and Australia), the millennial new users, and the main source of growth in 
use, are developing countries and countries in transition (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Turkey). In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the aggregate impact of the spread of antidumping 
on trade. 
From the extensive literature on antidumping, we identify four channels through which the use of 
antidumping might affect the aggregate trade of a nation.  These derive from: standard protection effects; 
from the fact that this protection is non-MFN in nature; from the fact that it is contingent protection; and 
from the fact that it is firm-specific.  These channels imply different hypotheses about the aggregate 
effects of antidumping which can then be empirically evaluated. 
Our empirical analysis is based on the gravity model framework which has become a standard tool in 
establishing an empirical baseline for the analysis of equilibrium trade patterns and deviations therefrom. 
Such a baseline needs, in principle, to reflect the underlying general equilibrium of the world trading 
system. With the development of theoretical foundations for the gravity model, along with its statistical 
success in accounting for trade patterns, the gravity model has increasingly become the econometric 
framework of choice when seeking to analyze deviations from expected trade between two countries 
Overall, our analysis suggests that the aggregate effects of AD in the context of the GATT/WTO system 
are modest. This should not be taken to imply that AD is not, or should not be, a matter of concern to the 
Liberal international trading system. Given the magnitude of duties, the sectoral distortions can be quite 
sizable. In addition, the control of protection and the advance of liberalization are the centerpieces of that 
system and AD protection is protection. At the same time, it does not seem useful to oversell the 
consequences of AD. Since it seems likely that contingent protection has played an important role in 
supporting trade liberalization, reflexive rejection seems particularly inappropriate. 
 
 1 Introduction
As with the wave of interest in the ￿new protection￿in the 1970s, we are now observing
a new wave of concern with a rapid increase in the use of ￿non-traditional￿protectionist
instruments (e.g. Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2006). Once again, the main culprit is contingent
protection (primarily antidumping and countervailing duties, though voluntary export
restraints￿ mainly coming from the safeguards process￿ also ￿gured prominently in the
1970s).1 The main di⁄erence is that in the 1970s the main users were industrial countries
(mainly the US, EU, Canada, and Australia), the millennial new users, and the main
source of growth in use, are developing countries and countries in transition (Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey).2 In this paper, we are primarily concerned
with the impact of the spread of antidumping on trade.
Before turning to a discussion of the main issues, we can ￿x the essential facts with
two ￿gures drawn from Zanardi (2006). Figure 1 shows the strong upward trend in
investigations and Figure 2 shows a more modest growth in the number of antidumping
orders in place. What both ￿gures make clear, however, is that while there may be some
downward trend in use of contingent protection by traditional users, the trend in new users
is strongly upward. Additional data presented in Zanardi (2006, Tables 1, 2, and 5) show
that the new users are drawn from nearly the full range of WTO members (the exception
being small, poor countries). This suggests the potential for very wide adoption and use
of these mechanisms. While the spread of contingent protection mechanisms, and their
use, is an undeniable fact, the scale of their use and the welfare e⁄ects are considerably
less certain. The public rhetoric, as well as that in much of the academic research on
antidumping, could easily give the impression that these e⁄ects are sizable. In this paper
we develop a framework within which we can evaluate most of the common hypotheses
1These forms of protection are ￿contingent￿ because they are dependent on a quasi-
judicial/bureaucratic ￿nding prior to application of the protection. By contrast, traditional protection is
￿statutory￿ , i.e. it is applied in every case, without any such ￿nding. This is a more useful distinction
than the common ￿tari⁄ v. nontari⁄ barrier￿distinction since contingent protection is usually included
in the latter even though it is implemented by tari⁄s.
2Note that the industrial countries continue to be quantitatively the biggest users, but growth in use
is coming from developing countries.
2relating to the aggregate e⁄ects of antidumping.
Our analysis will be based on the gravity model framework which has become a stand-
ard tool in establishing an empirical baseline for the analysis of equilibrium trade patterns
and deviations therefrom (Feenstra, 2004). Such a baseline needs, in principle, to re￿ ect
the underlying general equilibrium of the world trading system. Early attempts to identify
deviations generated by the presence of various forms of protection sought to use the struc-
ture provided by the Heckscher-Ohlin model but did not appear to produce convincing
results (e.g. Leamer, 1987; 1990). With the development of theoretical foundations for
the gravity model, along with its statistical success in accounting for trade patterns, the
gravity model has increasingly become the econometric framework of choice when seek-
ing to analyze deviations from expected trade between two countries.3 More recently, the
gravity model has also been used to evaluate the e⁄ect of fundamental institutions such as
the WTO and various forms of preferential trade and currency arrangement.4 In the next
section we develop the motivation for our analysis of the link between antidumping and
trade volume, followed by a presentation of our theoretical and econometric framework.
Then we present our empirical results and robustness in the following sections.
2 The link between antidumping and trade volume
The literature on the economics and political economy of antidumping (henceforth ￿AD￿ )
is large, but we can identify four classes of channel through which AD a⁄ects trade
3The key papers providing theoretical foundations for the gravity model are: Anderson (1979),
Bergstrand (1985; 1989), and Deardor⁄(1998). The industry standard, on which we also rely, is Anderson
and VanWincoop (2003). Wall (1999) provides a useful discussion of the gravity model as a framework
for evaluating the e⁄ect of protection on trade.
4For instance, Rose (2004a; 2004b) ￿nds that membership in the WTO has no systematic e⁄ect on
trade pattern, while Subramanian and Wei (forth.) ￿nds that WTO membership exerts a powerful and
positive impact on trade for a subset of countries that adopt liberalizing policies as part of accession
to the WTO. Baldwin (1994), Frankel (1997), and Baier and Bergstrand (forthcoming) use the gravity
model to examine the trade e⁄ects of regional trading blocs, while the results in Frankel and Rose (2002),
Rose (2000), and Rose and VanWincoop (2001) point to the relevance of (various forms of) currency
arrangements on trade volume.
3volumes:5 direct protection e⁄ects; e⁄ects due to the contingent nature of protection;
e⁄ects due to the non-MFN nature of protection; and e⁄ects due to the ￿rm-speci￿c
nature of protection. We consider each in turn.
Direct e⁄ects of protection recognize that AD tari⁄s are protection, and protection
reduces trade volumes and welfare. As with all other forms of protection, there are a
variety of strong cases to be made against protection as a policy instrument for most uses.
In particular, protection distorts incentives leading to suboptimal use of scarce national
resources. Especially in the context of very low statutory rates of protection, the often
very high rates of contingent protection can imply substantial distortion. These e⁄ects
should cause reduced trade between the country imposing the duty and the exporter to
that country￿ s market. However, the measured aggregate e⁄ects are rather low. Rough
and ready analyses for the case of the US suggest that the welfare cost of AD may be
as low as $2-4 billion for the US in 1993 (Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn, 1999).6 This is
hardly surprising since the amount of trade directly a⁄ected by contingent protection is
quite small￿ less than 5% of trade ￿ ows.7
A related direct e⁄ect has to do with retaliation. Following research on retaliation in
general models of protection, recent research has suggested that the trade volume e⁄ects
(and welfare e⁄ects) of protection could be worse if the trading partner retaliates (Prusa
and Skeath, 2002). On the other hand, as Blonigen and Bown (2003) argue, protection
may be less likely in a dyad where both parties possess an AD mechanism. In the latter
case, then, the spread of AD would be trade increasing.
Beyond the standard problems with protection, there are three additional classes of
issue more-or-less unique to AD: one directly related to its contingent nature; a second
related to its non-MFN nature; and a third related to its ￿rm-speci￿c nature. Because
5For surveys of the work on antidumping see: Blonigen and Prusa (2003), Falvey and Nelson (2006),
and Nelson (2006).
6According to the 2006 Economic Report of the President, in 1993 the US GDP was $6.7 trillion.
7There are other sources of cost, most prominently rent-seeking and dynamic e⁄ects, but these are
unlikely to a⁄ect the trade volumes that are the empirical focus of this paper. For example, for the US,
the costs of ￿ling cases are moderate and, at least over the sample period of this paper, revenues from
antidumping went into general revenue and weren￿ t seekable as such. This changed with the adoption
of the Byrd amendment in 2000.
4contingent protection is contingent on an administrative decision, it is in its nature un-
certain. A ￿rm currently facing statutory protection would presumably prefer a positive
probability of the ￿xed level of protection to that ￿xed level of protection with certainty,
but given the support of tari⁄s that the AD authorities draw from, they may well be
averse to a more general AD duty lottery. Furthermore, ￿rms that are not exposed to a
statutory tari⁄ will be unambiguously negatively a⁄ected by exposure to AD risk. There
is considerable anecdotal evidence that foreign ￿rms do, in fact, price in such a way as to
avoid AD risk (though, for obvious reasons, there is essentially no systematic evidence on
the extent of this practice). Nonetheless, it is perfectly plausible that protection against
one line of goods from a given exporter, i, could have e⁄ects on exports of other goods
from i, the same line of goods from other countries, and even producers of other goods
from other countries. The breadth of this e⁄ect leads Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006)
to refer to this as the ￿global chilling e⁄ect￿of AD.
A third source of concern is that AD protection, because it responds to exports from
speci￿c countries, violates the fundamental GATT/WTO commitment to nondiscrimina-
tion via the most favored nation (MFN) clause in article 1 of the GATT agreement. As
an empirical matter, the problem of non-MFN protection is that the overall e⁄ects are
ambiguous. Even if we presume that the net e⁄ect of an AD duty on total imports from
the home country of ￿rms named in the AD complaint is negative (as seems plausible, but
which we can test for), the e⁄ect on exports from non-named ￿rms, and especially ￿rms
from non-named countries, is not at all clear. On the one hand, recent work by Prusa
(2001) ￿nds that, in addition to suppressing imports from named countries, AD protec-
tion seems to increase imports from non-named countries (this would be the equivalent
of ￿trade diversion￿ ). In addition, Bown and Crowley (2006a; 2006b) also ￿nd ￿trade
de￿ ection￿(restricted exporters increase their exports to unrestricted third markets). On
the other hand, where Bown and Crowley focus on the e⁄ects of AD duties on the export
behavior of ￿rms from a single country (Japan), Prusa (2001) and Vandenbussche and
Zanardi (2006) argue that, for essentially the reasons outlined above, the active use of
AD is expected to generally reduce imports.
5Finally, as we have noted already, AD is ￿rm-speci￿c protection. Filing an AD com-
plaint has positive costs, so we must presume that the expected gain from such a ￿ling
is positive. These gains may ￿ ow directly from ￿ling or from the expected grant of pro-
tection. An enormous literature has sought to explicate and empirically identify these
gains.8 For home ￿rms, the bene￿ts of ￿ling come in the form of either harassment or, in
a strategic context, signalling or raising rivals￿costs.9 Similarly, the bene￿ts of a positive
expectation of an AD duty ￿ ow from either standard distributional e⁄ects of protection,
rent-shifting, or supporting collusion a la Krishna￿ s (1989) trade restrictions as facilit-
ating devices. Given the number of potential strategic variables and market structures,
it is probably not surprising that virtually any outcome is possible here. While there is
some, usually rather indirect, evidence that such collusion may be present, identifying
magnitudes (or even direction of e⁄ect) has proved virtually impossible.10
In the next section we develop our empirical framework. Following that we will suggest
8Much contemporary research, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on the strategic elements of
administered protection, concluding that the costs of administered protection are probably far in excess
of those implied by simply looking at amounts of trade covered by dumping orders and levels of protection
in those lines. Surveys of this work can be found in Blonigen and Prusa (2003) and Nelson (2006).
9There is some evidence of a harassment motivation￿ though the most sophisticated attempt to
identify such a motivation found only a very small number of cases of this sort (Staiger and Wolak,
1994, 1996).
One channel through which the presence of a contingent protection mechanism a⁄ects outcomes, even
if we do not observe cases ￿led, is that ￿rms may alter their strategic behavior to take into account
the possibility of ￿ling a case. Because such behavior distorts the allocation of resources, it has been
called indirect rent-seeking (Leidy, 1994). For example, foreign ￿rms may compete less aggressively so
as to avoid an antidumping complaint. In addition to changing the terms of non-cooperative interaction
between home and foreign ￿rms, it is also quite possible that the presence of contingent protection may
support collusion among home and foreign ￿rms where, once again, we need not observe contingent
protection in equilibrium.
10While this work is clever and suggests a warning that standard measures of cost of protection may be
substantial underestimates of those costs, it is important to recognize that there is virtually no compelling
empirical work here. In fact, there is a somewhat awkward tension between this conclusion and the
work, from an anti-trust perspective, which suggests that most cases could not pass a ￿rst-stage Joskow-
Klevorik predation test (Shin, 1998). That is, most cases do not seem to involve the kind of market
structure that would permit anti-trust action. It is possible that it is the cases not ￿led (i.e. cases in
which the presence of the threat of an antidumping case supports collusion) really do yield high costs,
but this seems improbable. It is ironic that, in a literature that stresses the disconnect between norms in
anti-trust and norms in contingent protection, the implicit presumption among antidumping scholars is
the Harvard presumption (i.e. that markets are presumed imperfectly competitive￿ mainly because this
raises the costs of antidumping), rather than the Chicago presumption (i.e. that the market is presumed
competitive).
6how each of the above e⁄ects can be identi￿ed within that framework.
3 An empirical gravity model for panel data
We consider an N country world where each country has a representative consumer whose
preferences are given by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function re￿ ect-
ing a love of variety (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979).11 That is, the utility










; i;j = 1;:::;N; (1)
where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution, cij is the consumption by consumers in j of a
single product originating in i, and ￿i is a distribution parameter that is inversely related
to country i￿ s fraction of world endowments. The budget constraint of consumers in j





where Yj is country j￿ s income (GDP), pi is the mill price of di⁄erentiated products in i,
and tij ￿ 1 is a trade cost index such that tij ￿ 1 is the fraction of consumer prices that
accrues to (tari⁄ and non-tari⁄) trade costs. Maximizing (1) subject to (2) determines







11In contrast to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979) we model countries here as endowment
economies as in Anderson and VanWincoop (2003) . Hence, we do not introduce separate variables for
the number of ￿rms in each economy, but we use the distribution parameter ￿i to indicate a country￿ s
mass in world supply.
7where the aggregate price of the consumption bundle of consumers in j under CES pref-










In an important recent contribution, Anderson and VanWincoop (2003) illustrate how


















j=1 Yj is world income.
Similarly, de￿ning ￿i ￿ Yi=YW and ￿j ￿ Yj=YW, expressions for price indices Pi;Pj






















Since the price index functions in (6) are non-linear in both trade frictions and the
parameters, Anderson and VanWincoop (2003) derive a non-linear estimation procedure
that obtains estimates of the impact of trade frictions on trade volumes.12 Recently, Baier
and Bergstrand (2006) suggest using a log-linear ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation
of Anderson and VanWincoop￿ s (2003) model. An advantage of the latter approach is its
computational simplicity and its performance which has been shown to obtain parameter
estimates that are very close to the ones relying on the non-linear procedure.
12Their focus is on the border e⁄ect for trade across US states and Canadian provinces relative to
intra-national trade among these regions. However, the argument naturally extends to estimating the
impact of trade frictions on trade volumes in such a model in general.












and then apply a ￿rst-order log-linear Taylor-series expansion centered at the symmetric,
non-zero trade cost equilibrium with cross-section data, tij = t 6= 1 and Pi = P = t
1
2 6= 1.13
This yields the following approximate log inverse price index expressions corresponding
to (7) for a symmetric world with trade frictions
￿lnP
1￿￿






































The ￿rst-order Taylor-series approximation to the gravity model, evaluated at symmetric
but non-zero trade frictions, for bilateral panel data in logs then reads
lnXijt = lnYit + lnYjt ￿ lnYW;t ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)lntijt



































Note that we have only outlined the deterministic part of the model in the above analysis.
We follow the majority of previous work on the estimation of bilateral trade ￿ ow models by
assuming that the stochastic part is linearly separable in a speci￿cation in logs as in (9).14
With panel data, the stochastic part of the model (let us refer to it as uijt) distinguishes
between two components: one that is constant across periods (the between country-pairs
dimension of the data) and the remaining part (the within country-pairs dimension of the
13They provide an alternative linearization at the zero-trade-cost equilibrium tij = t = 1 and Pi = P =
1. However, the latter seems less plausible from an empirical point of view.
14See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for an exception.
9data￿ Glick and Rose (2002) refer to the latter as the time-series dimension). In formal
accounts, the overall stochastic component for country-pair ij and year t may be written
as
uijt = ￿ij + ￿ijt: (10)
Clearly, ￿ij is the time-invariant part of the error term, while ￿ijt is an idiosyncratic dis-
turbance term. There are two main options for modeling ￿ij. First, assuming a speci￿c
functional form ￿ij could be modeled as random. However, for this to obtain consistent
model parameter estimates all observables included in the model have to be independent
not only of ￿ijt but also of ￿ij. Otherwise, the parameter estimates are biased and incon-
sistent. Second, one can estimate the parameter ￿ij for each country-pair ij. Obviously
this is less e¢ cient than assuming ￿ij as random. Implicitly, it means that we have to
estimate not only a single constant for the model but one for each country-pair. Since
the number of country-pairs is much larger than the available time periods in typical
gravity models, the parameters ￿ij will be highly inaccurate. However, usually we are
not interested in the estimates of ￿ij but rather in the parameters of the covariates in
the model. While their parameters will also be less accurate than in a model where ￿ij
is random, the ￿xed country-pair e⁄ects estimator is immune to the problem of possible
correlation between the covariates and the ￿ij. Therefore, the model with a ￿xed ￿ij is a
benchmark case and the one with a random ￿ij needs to obtain parameter estimates for
the covariates that are very similar to the ￿xed ￿ij estimator. Hence, the reliability of
the random country-pair e⁄ects model is testable (see Hausman, 1978) and with bilateral
trade volume data it is typically signi￿cantly rejected against its ￿xed country-pair e⁄ects
counterpart (see Glick and Rose, 2002; Cheng and Wall, 2005). While this might be seen
as a problem of panel data, in fact it only raises serious concerns about parameters in
cross-section models. The random country-pair e⁄ects estimator can be shown to be a
weighted average of the ￿xed country-pair e⁄ects model and a time-averaged cross-section
model (see Baltagi, 2005). Under the outlined assumptions, rejection of the random e⁄ects
model due to correlation between the covariates and the ￿ij implies that the cross-section
10estimates are biased and inconsistent. Since previous evidence on gravity models points
in that direction, we focus on panel econometric ￿xed e⁄ects estimates throughout.
While ours is not the ￿rst attempt to apply such techniques in the context of gravity
models, their introduction in the literature on the quanti￿cation of trade volume response
to trade policy is novel to the best of our knowledge.15
4 Data description
While the model of Anderson and VanWincoop (2003), and Baier and Bergstrand￿ s (2006)
approximation thereof, can be used for a gravity model-based quanti￿cation of the trade
friction impact on trade volumes in general, previous work focused on the estimation of
border e⁄ects.16 By way of contrast, our goal is to analyze the bilateral and multilateral
responses of trade volumes to trade impediments in general and to AD investigations in
particular.
4.1 Trade volumes and GDP
We use bilateral export volumes (Xijt) and exporter as well as importer GDPs (Yit;Yjt)
as published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The corresponding ￿gures are
expressed in nominal U.S. dollars and span the period from 1960 to 2002 at the annual
level. Bilateral export data are based on the Direction of Trade statistics and GDP is
available from the International Financial Statistics.
4.2 Geographical and cultural trade frictions
Geographical trade frictions are well-known for their robust negative impact on bilateral
trade ￿ ows. In particular, geographical distance and (the absence of) common borders
15Baier and Bergstrand (forthcoming) provide an analysis of the trade friction e⁄ects with panel data.
While they include ￿xed e⁄ects to avoid biased estimates of the parameters, a compulsory quanti￿cation
of the e⁄ect of trade frictions cannot be retrieved in their case (see Feenstra, 2004).
16More precisely, that research sought to provide an explanation of the strong, negative e⁄ect of national
borders on trade volumes among Canadian provinces and U.S. states as compared to that of state and
province borders on inter-regional trade within these two countries.
11should be mentioned here (e.g. Bergstrand 1985; 1989; Anderson and VanWincoop 2004).
We compute bilateral great circle distances (DISTij) between two countries￿capitals
based on the longitude and latitude as published in the CIA World Factbook. The same
source provides information on a country￿ s common borders with other economies. Since
our focus is on trade frictions, we depart from previous research by designing a dummy
variable that takes the value one in the absence of a common border and zero otherwise
(NBORDij). Furthermore, we follow the same principle by de￿ning a cultural (language)
distance variable that is one in the absence of a common o¢ cial language and zero oth-
erwise (NLANGij).
4.3 Political trade frictions: regional trade agreements and an-
tidumping investigations
We use several di⁄erent binary political trade friction indicators. Most importantly for
the purposes of this paper, we employ variables giving the number of AD investigations
of an importer against its exporting trading partner.17 We use this information on AD
activity to construct two variables (and lags thereof) for use in our empirical models. The
￿rst is a count variable re￿ ecting the number of AD investigations importing country j
has initiated against exporting country i in year t (ADijt). We expect the parameter of
ADijt to be negative if concurrent AD investigations impede exports of a country whose
17Data on antidumping investigations are collected from various sources. First of all, we take advantage
of Chad Bown￿ s series of antidumping cases from the year 1980 onwards. The data are available in tables
format at http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/. In fact, much more information is available
there than we make use of and these data may be a rich source for future research.
In addition to Bown￿ s data, we have compiled data on bilateral antidumping investigations before
1980. In particular, data on the European Union￿ s (then, the European Community￿ s) investigations
are collected in the appendix to Beseler and Williams (1986). The data on Australia, South Africa,
United Kingdom, and the United States stem from the from the General Agreement on Trade and Tari⁄s
(GATT), in particular the supplement to its Basic Instruments and Selected Documents and national
sources, for example: Australian Customs Service, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the DTI (for
South Africa), and other countries￿agencies Bruce Blonigen provides web-links on his homepage to a set
of countries￿administrative o¢ ces.
Note that Zanardi (2006) provides information at the unilateral level by summarizing the investigations
at the investigator country level as available from the GATT￿ s supplement to its Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents publication. While Zanardi￿ s article is a rich source as well, it is not useful for our
purpose due to the absence of country-pair information for investigations.
12￿rms have been ￿led on. In addition, we allow for a separate impact of an accumulation
of investigations at the country-pair level. Speci￿cally, we use the cumulative number of
AD investigations for a country-pair, indicating how many AD investigations economy j
has launched against country i until year t (CADijt). This would re￿ ect a particularly
long memory in trade response to earlier investigations.
Following other work, we use information on (the absence of) common regional trade
agreement membership for each country-pair and year, one for customs unions (NCUijt)
and the other one for free trade areas (NFTAijt) as noti￿ed to the WTO.18
4.4 De￿nition of the trade friction variable tijt
While we have used a single symbol tijt for trade costs in section 3, the preceding sub-
sections suggest that tijt is an aggregate of ADijt, CADijt, NCUijt, NFTAijt, DISTij,
NBORDij, and NLANGij.19 In the aggregation, we follow the literature by assuming a
log-linear functional form
lntijt = ￿1ADijt + ￿2CADijt
+ ￿3NCUijt + ￿4NFTAijt
+ ￿5 lnDISTij + ￿6NBORDij + ￿7NLANGij: (11)
Following Anderson and VanWincoop (2003), we use lnxijt ￿ lnXijt￿lnYit￿lnYjt instead
of Xijt as the left-hand-side variable in the sequel.
To implement the Baier-Bergstrand approximation, for each variable in lntijt we col-
lect terms in (9) into a variable indicated by a tilde. For instance, the term correspond-
18In the sensitivity analysis summarized in Table 2, we allow for a further impact of other preferential
trade agreements noti￿ed to the WTO, WTO non-membership of either one or two countries of a pair, and
the absence of currency arrangements such as currency union, currency peg, or currency band membership
as documented by the IMF. Also, we consider the role of once and twice lagged antidumping (ADij;t￿1,
ADij;t￿2, CADij;t￿1, CADij;t￿2) and, ￿nally, we use an exporter￿ s antiduming investigations against the
importer (ADjit, CADjit) as additional control variables there to capture dynamic e⁄ects of antidumping
and sluggish response of trade ￿ ows to antidumping.
19Analogously, the other trade friction indicators mentioned above will be included in the sensitivity
analysis of Sub-section 5.2.
13ing to lnDISTij is the ￿rst-order Taylor-series approximation evaluated at an equilib-











j=1 lnDISTij, and similarly for all other
trade barrier variables. Note that the latter approximation reveals an analogy to the
two-way panel data within estimator (here, with ￿xed exporter-by-time and importer-by-
time e⁄ects). Variable ln ^ DIST ij is de￿ned as the exporter-by-year and importer-by-year
demeaned DISTij, and similarly for the other trade barrier variables. The only di⁄er-
ence by comparison to the two-way within model is that the left-hand-side variable is not
demeaned in the Baier and Bergstrand (2006) approach.
Inserting (11) in (9) and using the above de￿nitions yields
lnxijt = ￿lnYW;t ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)ln￿1 ln g ADijt ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿2^ CADijt
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿3^ NCUijt ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿4 ^ NFTAijt ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿5 ln ^ DIST ij
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿6 ^ NBORDij ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿7 ^ NLANGij + uijt: (12)
The speci￿cation in (12) could be estimated by either adding lnYW;t to both sides of the
model or, in a less restrictive approach, by replacing ￿lnYW;t by ￿xed time e⁄ects.20 If
the number of country-pairs in the data is as large as in our application, one can apply a
country-pair within estimator to eliminate the possible correlation of the covariates with
￿ij. The parameter estimates ￿k for k = 1;:::;4 are then the ￿xed e⁄ects benchmark
coe¢ cients.
20Then, the coe¢ cient of ￿lnYW;t does not have to be unity any more.
145 Panel data estimates of the impact of antidumping
investigations on trade volumes
5.1 Baseline results
In the empirical analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the counterpart
to (12) that uses non-demeaned trade friction variables on the right-hand side. While
this model accounts for the possible in￿ uence of time-invariant variables, it ignores the
impact of multilateral resistance on trade volume.21 Second, we summarize the ￿ndings
of the transformed model as in (12). A comparison of the corresponding model outcome
with that one based on the properly demeaned model sheds light on the importance of
multilateral versus bilateral e⁄ects of trade frictions on trade volume in general and of
AD in particular. The null hypothesis of a zero impact of multilateral resistance is even
testable.
We run each of these two models by pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) and the
￿xed country-pair e⁄ects estimator. Pooled OLS assumes that the included explanatory
variables are uncorrelated with the time-invariant unobservables that are collected in the
between error term (￿ij) while the ￿xed e⁄ects model does not. Since the geographical
and cultural variables in the model (lnDISTij, NBORDij, NLANGij) are time-invariant,
they will be wiped out by the ￿xed country-pair e⁄ects estimator so that their coe¢ cients
are only reported with pooled OLS.
￿Table 1 ￿
Table 1 provides a summary of results for the four models. The results suggest the
following conclusions. First, the test statistics reject the pooled OLS Models A and C
against their ￿xed country-pair e⁄ects counterparts B and D. Second, Models A and B
21With panel data, the multilateral resistance terms can principally be captured by ￿xed exporter-by-
time and importer-by-time e⁄ects￿ see Baltagi, Egger and Pfa⁄ermayr (2003) for such a model. However,
with a large data set as ours this involves a huge matrix of dummy variables that is infeasible to handle
by standard computer hardware.
15ignore the role of multilateral resistance and are rejected against their cum-multilateral-
resistance-term counterparts, Models C and D. Since Model D is clearly preferable on
econometric grounds over Models A-C, we focus on the discussion of the corresponding
parameters in the sequel.
The point estimates for the parameter of ADijt indicates that a single AD investiga-
tion exerts a signi￿cantly negative, contemporaneous, direct impact on bilateral export of
about e￿0:073 ’ ￿7:03%.22 According to the much smaller (in absolute value) and insigni-
￿cant parameter of CADijt, there is no indication of a long memory in trade responsiveness
to AD in that model. Hence, investigations of an importer against an exporter in the past
do not impede concurrent trade volume.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Before turning to the quanti￿cation of the impact of AD investigations on trade volume,
we provide a sensitivity analysis of the baseline estimates in Table 1. Overall, we provide
nine alternative sets of results for the parameters of interest (namely, those of ADijt and
CADijt). Our ￿ndings are summarized in Table 2A.
￿Table 2 ￿
Experiment (i)￿ including further trade friction variables: In a ￿rst step, we
augment our speci￿cation of Model D by six additional covariates related to trade frictions:
absence of preferential (other than customs union of free trade area) membership; absence
of WTO membership for one of the two countries; absence of WTO membership for both
countries; absence of currency union membership; absence of currency peg membership;
absence of currency band membership. Most of these variables have been shown to a⁄ect
trade volumes. As we note in the introduction, all of these variables have been shown, at
22This magnitude may strike the reader as quite large. However, note that this re￿ ects only the direct
impact of ADijt on trade ￿ ows within an overall highly nonlinear framework. A valid quanti￿cation of
the e⁄ect of antidumping investigations is quite tricky, here, since we have to compute the associated
change of g ADijt through an increase in ADijt for all country-pairs. We pursue this explicitly in section
5.4, where we will see that this ends up being a very small e⁄ect.
16least in some analyses, to signi￿cantly a⁄ect trade patterns. Indeed, we ￿nd that these
variables exert a jointly signi￿cant (at one percent) impact on bilateral exports. However,
their omission does not in￿ uence the point estimates of the parameters of interest, ￿ADijt
and ￿CADijt.
Experiments (ii) and (iii)￿ dynamic e⁄ects of antidumping: By including
CADijt along with ADijt, Model D accounts for a dynamic e⁄ect of AD on trade volume,
but in a very crude way. In Experiment (ii) we include once lagged levels of our AD
variables (ADij;t￿1, CADij;t￿1) to the speci￿cation in Experiment (i), and in Experiment
(iii) we additionally include the twice lagged levels thereof (ADij;t￿2, CADij;t￿2). Hence,
these speci￿cations capture time-variant in￿ uence of contemporaneous versus lagged AD
investigations as in autoregressive distributed lag models. Since we are interested in the
long-run e⁄ects of AD in the sequel, we report its cumulated impact with these two
experiments￿ ￿ADijt +￿ADij;t￿1(+￿ADij;t￿2) and ￿CADijt +￿CADij;t￿1(+￿CADij;t￿2), respect-
ively. We ￿nd that the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator of Model D substantially underestimates
the impact of both current and cumulative investigations; however, we also ￿nd that the
inclusion of a second lag provides essentially no additional impact on trade volume.23
Experiment (iv)￿ the exporter￿ s investigations and their impact on bilateral
export volume: In the next experiment, we include the exporter￿ s AD investigation
variables ADjit and CADjit, respectively, in addition to the covariates in Experiment (iii).
We do so to make sure that we do not ascribe an e⁄ect to the importer￿ s investigations
that in fact is due to exporter activity. Again, these two variables contribute signi￿cantly
to the explanation of bilateral, normalized export volume. However, the parameters of
interest are not statistically di⁄erent from those in Experiment (iii) as can be seen from
the point estimates and the t-statistics reported in Table 2.
Experiment (v)￿ systematically missing trade values: Recent research provides
an explanation of zero trade among trading partners with particular characteristics (e.g.
Evenett and Venables, 2002; Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006; Helpman, Melitz and Rubin-
23This holds true although not only the once lagged but also the twice lagged antidumping investigation
variables contribute signi￿cantly to the model. We have run speci￿cations with even more than two lags,
but the results remain stable.
17stein, 2006). With a log-linear model like ours, the dependent variable may be missing
for three reasons: bilateral trade is truly zero; bilateral trade values are not reported;24
or GDP values are not available. As a result, selection into the sample might lead to a
biased impact of the AD investigation parameters of interest. We check for the sensitivity
of the ￿ndings by correcting the speci￿cation as in Experiment (iv) for sample selection
bias.25 We follow Wooldridge (1995) by applying a sample selection model that is suitable
for panel data with ￿xed e⁄ects.26 This model rests on inverse Mill￿ s ratios as selection
correction variables that are based on annual probit models. These probit models employ
the multilateral resistance transformed and untransformed variables as in Experiment (iv)
and time-invariant geographical and cultural determinants (see Footnote f in Table 2 for
details). In all years, these variables possess high joint relevance (they are signi￿cant at
one percent throughout). A test of sample selection following Wooldridge (1995) indic-
ates that there is signi￿cant (at one percent) selection into the sample conditional on this
speci￿cation. However, there is little impact on the point estimates of the parameters of
interest.
Experiment (vi)￿ accounting for zero trade ￿ ows in a Poisson quasi-maximum-
likelihood model: Recently, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest accounting for
zero bilateral trade ￿ ows in a Poisson model. There, only the right-hand-side of the
speci￿cation is logarithmically transformed but not the dependent variable. Hence, zero
trade ￿ ows are not dropped by log-transforming the model. In our data-set, there are
588;095 zero bilateral export values across all years. Hence, the number of observations
in the Poisson model is 882;451 while it was only 294;356 in the log-export-based speci￿c-
ations. For the sake of consistent estimates, we follow the Mundlak-Chamberlain device
and include country-pair means of all explanatory variables in the model along with the
original variables. This leads to parameter estimates for the original variables that are
to be interpreted as within country-pair estimates as in the previous models. Addition-
24Zero trade and missing trade values are typically not satisfactorily distinguishable in trade matrices.
25We do not use the model as of Experiment (v) since the use of GDP in the selection model leads to
an unnecessary loss of observations.
26Cross-section procedures as in Helpman et al. (2006) or Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), are not
applicable in this case, as pointed out by Wooldridge (1995).
18ally, the estimates are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as suggested by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Obviously, the estimated impact of AD and CAD is
similar to the baseline results. While the point estimate for the impact of AD on bilateral
exports is higher than before, the parameter is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the original
estimates
Experiment (vii)￿ using the number of impositions of preliminary anti-
dumping measures instead of the investigations: We might reasonably expect that
the primary e⁄ect of AD on trade comes only with the actual imposition of AD duties.
Unfortunately, neither Bown￿ s data (which begin in 1980) nor the data we have been able
to collect permit us to treat this question over the entire GATT/WTO time period. Thus,
as an additional experiment, we consider the subperiod from 1980. Interestingly, the res-
ults point to a somewhat smaller point estimate of the long run impact of impositions
than for investigations for the longer time span. However, the parameter estimates are
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent between Experiments (iv) and (vi).27
Experiments (viii)￿ using GDP-weighted rather than simple averages in the
Baier and Bergstrand (2006) approach to account for multilateral resistance:
Baier and Bergstrand suggest an alternative speci￿cation of multilateral resistance, where
the original trade friction variables are not transformed by subtracting simple exporter
and importer means but rather GDP-weighted ones. The latter transformation is associ-
ated with a Taylor-series approximation around the zero trade friction equilibrium. This
speci￿cation leads to a lower point estimate of the AD impact. However, this e⁄ect is
estimated at less precision than the original ones so that it is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the baseline estimates.
Based on the analysis in this section we will generally use the speci￿cation in exper-
iment (iv) as our main framework. In addition, we will compare the results from this
speci￿cation against ones that are based on applied measures as in experiment (vii).
27One explanation for this may be the high correlation between non-transformed and transformed
antidumping investigations and the impositions of antidumping measures. The correlation coe¢ cients
amount to 0.64 and 0.62 (impositions), respectively.
195.3 Discussion of hypotheses on trade volume e⁄ects of anti-
dumping
In section 2 we presented four broad classes of channel that the literature on AD has
identi￿ed as a⁄ecting trade volumes: direct protection e⁄ects; e⁄ects due to contingent
nature of protection; e⁄ects due to non-MFN nature of protection; and e⁄ects due to ￿rm-
speci￿c nature of protection. In section 3 we developed the model that resulted in our
empirical speci￿cation in equation (12). In this section we express the predicted e⁄ects
as hypotheses of this model and present some estimates of these e⁄ects. Section 5.4 will
present our analysis of the quantitative magnitude of the major e⁄ects.
The most obvious implementation of our key question is to ask whether the use of
AD by country j on the imports from country i (implemented as exports from i to j)
reduces the volume of those imports. In terms of the speci￿cation in equation (12), this
implies that ￿1 < 0: As the estimates reported in table 2 suggest, we do ￿nd a statistically
signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of AD in the year of initiation. In our sensitivity analysis, we also
considered one and two period lags of AD, both of which are signi￿cant. More importantly,
it is clear that inclusion of one lag is necessary to capture the e⁄ects of AD on trade in
a given period, but that the second lag contributes little to the analysis. Because the
data on applied measures are not available for many countries over the entire time period
of interest, we have de￿ned our AD (and CAD) variables in terms of initiations. Given
data availability and a reasonably high correlation between initiations and application of
duties, this seems a sensible strategy. However, experiment (iv) directly examines the
number of cases in which duties were applied as a robustness check. Consistent with
our expectations, ￿1 is negative and statistically signi￿cant with a magnitude roughly
similar (in fact, slightly smaller) to the value of the parameter estimated in our baseline
speci￿cation estimated on initiations.28
28Using data from Bown￿ s data-set, so covering the period 1980-2001, we also considered speci￿cations
in which AD was implemented as each component: duties; suspension agreements; and price undertakings.
Speci￿cations involving the contemporaneous values, one and two lags of these variables were considered.
With the exception of a speci￿cation in which two lags of price undertakings were considered, none of
these achieved conventional levels of signi￿cance. The speci￿cation involving one and two lags of the
20It is interesting to note that the coe¢ cient on our CAD variable, ￿2, is greater than
zero. This variable is intended to pick up the long-run e⁄ects of AD in the relevant
dyad. We capture the contemporaneous, the once-lagged, and the twice-lagged impact
in ￿1, so those countries that applied many AD-measures in the past now have fewer of
them.29 For the overall impact of AD note that a country￿ s cumulative number of AD
actions grows by de￿nition, while contemporaneous ADs may increase or fall over time.
Altogether, the cumulative impact (through ￿2) reduces the contemporaneous one. The
smaller the change relative to a dyad￿ s average number of AD actions across the years
in a given time span, the smaller is the reduction of the direct impact of AD (through
￿1; for a given dyadic change in AD over time) by that of the cumulative one (through
￿2). Hence, ￿2 ￿ CAD reduces the impact of ￿1 ￿ AD, and this reduction depends on the
level and change in both AD and CAD.30 This e⁄ect might be picking up some of the
retaliation e⁄ects, which we consider explicitly below.
A second set of hypotheses relate to the ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects of AD protection. We
considered two broad arguments here: harassment; and strategic e⁄ects. In the case of
harassment, we would expect the e⁄ect to ￿ ow from initiation, so we can use our full
dataset. The hypothesis would be ￿1 < 0. In the case of strategic e⁄ects, it is not
clear whether we should be focusing on initiations or implementations, but in either case
the hypothesis is ￿1 < 0. As with the hypothesis of general direct e⁄ects we do ￿nd a
statistically signi￿cant negative impact of both initiation and implementation. Since these
three hypotheses make observationally equivalent predictions, our results do not allow us
to choose between hypotheses.31 We can, however, consider the magnitudes involved. We
price-undertaking variable was signi￿cantly negative, though the cumulative impact of the two lags was
not signi￿cant. Full results are available on request.
29This is precisely the pattern of use that we see in ￿gures 2 and 3, where both initiations and imple-
mentations by traditional users have declined over time while use by new users has increased dramatically.
30It should be noted that, since our framework explicitly incorporates multilateral resistance, the overall
impact of AD activity (both contemporaneous and cumulative) also depends on what happens in the other
dyads.
31As we noted in section 2: for strategic e⁄ects to be macroeconomically signi￿cant (and thus show
up in analysis of the sort we consider here) would require implausible market structure conditions at the
global level; and econometric work at the microeconomic level has not found much in the way of support
for the harassment hypothesis (Staiger and Wolak, 1994, 1996). Thus, we are predisposed to believe
that the e⁄ects we have identi￿ed ￿ ow from direct e⁄ects.
21consider this in the next section.
A third set of hypotheses derive from the non-MFN nature of AD protection. The
essential issue here is trade diversion. In thinking about trade diversion in the context of
a gravity model, there are several important things to note. First, the direct impact of a
country￿ s AD investigations on dyadic exports￿ given everybody else￿ s actions￿ is identical
to the parameter in Table 2 (of course, our left-hand-side variable is in logs, so the elasticity
in percent would be about 100 ￿ (e￿1￿V ar(￿1) ￿ 1).32 Second, the impact on the average
dyadic number of AD investigations for the average exporter in year t is quite small
as is that on the average dyadic number of AD investigations for the average importer.
The impact on the overall average dyadic number of AD investigations for all pairs is
even smaller. The negative of the change in exporter-by-time average number of AD
investigations minus that of the importer-by-time average number of AD investigations
plus that of the time average number of AD investigations is the third-country change
[i.e. ￿
￿
￿AD￿jt ￿ ADi￿t + AD￿t
￿
;where ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator]. Recall that￿ in
contrast to the following table￿ we￿ re talking about the ￿marginal￿impact of a single AD
investigation on bilateral trade here. Clearly, the direct impact of AD on trade is captured
by ￿1￿ADijt = ￿1 from which it follows that the e⁄ect due to multilateral resistance is
￿1￿
￿
￿AD￿jt ￿ ADi￿t + AD￿t
￿
< 1; since the parameter for both e⁄ects is the same, the
diversion e⁄ect is smaller than the creation e⁄ect (of course, since ￿1 < 0, here, we￿ re
faced with a negative creation e⁄ect). Beyond that, we may say that with a world-wide
increase of usage, the diversion e⁄ect will decline, since the means will be a⁄ected less
than before by a unitary increase of a single country￿ s AD investigations but the direct
e⁄ect is always multiplied by ￿ADijt = 1. The latter has some interesting implications.
For instance, if there is a clustered entry into the group of AD mechanism access-group,
the diversion e⁄ect for a single country is smaller in the phase of clustered entry while
it is relatively larger in a phase without clustered entry and usage. On the other hand,
the world-wide overall diversion e⁄ect is then large, since all countries together have a
32Note that the e⁄ect of a unitary change in AD on exports is not well approximated by 100￿(e￿1 ￿1)
in a semi-log model as indicated by Van Garderen and Shah (2002).
22sizeable impact on the change of the means.
￿Table 3A ￿
A third set of hypotheses involves contingent protection e⁄ects, or what Vandenbussche
and Zanardi (2006) call the ￿global chilling e⁄ect￿ ￿ the e⁄ect on all trading partners of
AD protection levied on any trading partner. In Table 3A we report three speci￿cations
in the spirit of VZ: using the sum of all AD initiations by country j against any country
in year t, in addition to the dyad-by-year speci￿c terms (Table 3A, Case 1); using the sum
of all AD implementations by country j against any country in year t, in addition to the
dyad-by-year speci￿c terms (Table 3A, Case 2); and introducing both of these variables at
the same time (Table 3A, Case 3).33 That is, we consider ADjt and CADjt in addition to
ADijt and CADijt. In no case are these variables signi￿cant, and the sign pattern among
speci￿cations is also unstable. Thus, we ￿nd no evidence in favor of ￿global chilling￿ .
￿Table 3B ￿
Retaliation is a more complex direct e⁄ect of AD. We saw in section 2 that retaliation
has both a trade reducing and trade increasing e⁄ect, and that these e⁄ects might be
conveyed by simply adopting an AD mechanism; by initiation, and/or by implementa-
tion. Thus, we consider a number of speci￿cations. Speci￿cally, we construct a dummy
which takes the value of unity if the exporter (country i) initiated an AD action against
the importer (country j) in period t or any other year before. We also consider this
variable interacted with the number of AD actions. We then use these variables in both
speci￿cations (iii) and (iv) (Table 3B, Cases 4-7). It turns out not only that these new
variables are not signi￿cant but, as can be seen from the ￿rst four cases in table 3B, the
values of ￿1 and ￿2 are essentially unchanged. Finally, we consider a speci￿cation with
three dummy variables: one each for whether the importer and exporter possess an AD
mechanism (variable takes a value of unity if yes), and an interaction term if both possess
33We can only use the full sample for the ￿rst speci￿cation. For the other two we can only use
1980-2001.
23an AD mechanism (Table 3B, Case 8). If retaliation were signi￿cant, we would expect
the interaction term to be signi￿cant.34 This is not the case. Thus, unless we want to
consider CAD and ￿2 ￿ CAD as evidence of retaliation, we ￿nd no evidence in favor of
this hypothesis.
5.4 Quanti￿cation of the antidumping e⁄ect on trade volume
between 1960 and 2000
Because we expect AD activity to a⁄ect long-run, as well as current, trade, we use the
model as in Experiment (iv) of Table 2 to quantify the impact on exports among the
covered economies. For this, we compare the contribution of AD alone to the predicted
change in various aggregates of the normalized export volume between 1960 and 2000. De-
note the predicted change in normalized exports by ￿ln ^ xij ￿ ln ^ xij;2000￿ln ^ xij;1960 and the
corresponding counterfactual change, where g ADij;2000 and ^ CADij;2000 (and their lags) are
replaced by g ADij;1960 and ^ CADij;1960 (and their lags) in ln ^ xij;2000. Denote the correspond-
ing counterfactual change by (￿ln ^ xc
ij). The di⁄erence between the two, ￿ln ^ xij￿￿ln ^ xc
ij
is an estimate of the impact of AD investigations on trade between 1960 and 2000. The
overall impact on export volume is the net e⁄ect of recent (AD) and past (CAD) changes
in the number of investigations.
We consider the e⁄ect of AD investigations on three di⁄erent averages of world trade
volume: ￿rst, the average country-pair in the sample (trade-weighted); second, the average
(trade-weighted) country-pair with an investigation importer (being de￿ned as one where
the cumulative number of investigations is greater than zero in the year 2000, CADij;2000 >
0); third, the (trade-weighted) average impact on country-pairs where the importer has
never investigated (CADij;2000 = 0). Table 4 summarizes our ￿ndings.
￿Table 4 ￿
The table suggests that the impact on exports is rather small. The reason for this
34The individual dummies take the same signs as the count variables tapping the same policies. Note
that, again, the parameters of the AD and CAD variables are essentially unchanged.
24is that, on average, g ADij;1960, g ADij;2000, ^ CADij;1960, ^ CADij;2000, and, most importantly,
their changes are rather small (see Table 5 in the Appendix). For the average country-
pair, the decline in bilateral exports between 1960 and 2000 that is attributable to AD
investigations is slightly more than a tenth of a percentage point. Of this, about 80
percent are due to the direct e⁄ect of bilateral AD rather than multilateral resistance.
However, multilateral resistance tends to raise the impact and, on average, works in the
same direction as the direct e⁄ect. Exports into AD-applying importers declined by about
1:6 percentage points over the same four decades. For these pairs, multilateral resistance
accounted for more than a third of the e⁄ect. Exports into non-AD-applying importers
increased marginally by about a third of a percentage point which was entirely due to
multilateral resistance.
6 Welfare e⁄ects of antidumping
In addition to calculating the e⁄ect on trade volumes, we can also use our structural
framework to estimate the welfare e⁄ects of antidumping as the equivalent variation in
percent associated with an annual change in AD and CAD for country i. For this, let us
de￿ne the estimated contribution of the kth trade friction variable to country i￿ s predicted
bilateral log exports to country j in the year t as c ￿k f lntk;ij;t, according to (9). For instance,
log bilateral trade due to contemporaneous antidumping would then be d ￿ADg ADij;t. With





k c ￿k f lntk;ij;t: (13)
According to the model assumptions,
PN
j=1 b Xij;t = b Yi;t. Using antidumping variables as
of t￿1 but other trade frictions as of the year t to construct counterfactual trade frictions
in logs as of t, referred to as c ￿k f lntk;ij;t;c, we may estimate counterfactual bilateral exports
25( b Xij;t;c) and GDP (b Yi;t;c =
PN
j=1 b Xij;t;c).35 Then, the equivalent variation for country i in
percent according to the observed change in AD and CAD between 2000 and t evaluated
at other variable levels as of the year t is de￿ned as
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￿ 1
1￿￿
is the CES price index
at original trade frictions in the year t and b Pi;t;c is similarly de￿ned for counterfactual
trade frictions. Since the elasticity of substitution parameter is not estimated directly,
we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) by assuming a level of ￿ = 5. Under
this assumption, we estimate an average annual welfare e⁄ect of antidumping that is
about ￿0:01 percent. The average annual e⁄ect on AD-applying countries is about ￿0:05
percent and that on AD-non-applying countries is about 0:002 percent, respectively. The
maximum estimated annual welfare e⁄ect of AD amounts to less than 1:5 percent. The
average annual reduction for the US amounts to 0:06 percent.36 The maximum estimated
annual AD-induced reduction in welfare for the US over the period 1960 to 2000 amounts
to less than 0:23 percent. Hence, consistent with the small impact on trade ￿ ows, the
estimated welfare e⁄ects of antidumping are small.
7 Conclusions
Overall, then, our analysis suggests that the aggregate e⁄ects of AD in the context of the
GATT/WTO system are modest. This should not be taken to imply that AD is not, or
should not be, a matter of concern to the Liberal international trading system. Given












36The only other estimate of the welfare e⁄ect of antidumping that we know of is that of Gallaway
et al. (1999). As we note above, they estimate that antidumping in 1993 reduced US welfare a maximum
of 0.06 percent (i.e. $2-4 billion welfare reduction in a year where US GDP was estimated to be $6.7
trillion). This is remarkably close to our average annual estimate for the US. In any event, both estimates
are very small.
26the magnitude of duties, the sectoral distortions can be quite sizable. In addition, the
control of protection and the advance of liberalization are the centerpieces of that system
and AD protection is protection. At the same time, it does not seem useful to oversell
the consequences of AD. Since it seems likely that contingent protection has played an
important role in supporting trade liberalization, re￿ exive rejection seems particularly
inappropriate.
This last point strikes us as important. As economists, our ￿rst line of response to
AD is surely negative. We applaud the reductions in tari⁄s associated with various trade
liberalizations, but abhor the ￿backsliding￿associated with administered protection. The
moral language is used advisedly: most of us view liberalization as an act of moral courage,
and reversals as moral weakness. Close students of AD, however, have long been clear that
the reality is considerably more complex. The e⁄ects on which this paper has focussed
are essentially micro-e⁄ects. That is, they refer to the e⁄ects within country-pairs (and,
at least intuitively, are driven by ￿rm/sector level e⁄ects). While such micro e⁄ects have
been the focus of the great majority of both theoretical and empirical research on AD,
systemwide (￿macro￿ ) e⁄ects have also been noted (Nelson, 2006). The ￿global chilling
e⁄ect￿ is in principle a macro e⁄ect, but we were unable to ￿nd any evidence of its
presence. Strongly positive macro e⁄ects have also been commented upon. From the very
earliest research on AD (e.g. Viner, 1923), it has been recognized that AD can be a central
part of a political strategy to support liberalization. Recent work by Finger and Nogues
(2005) provides strong case study evidence that, at least in a number of Latin American
countries engaged in liberalization episodes in the 1980s, AD was used in precisely this
way. To the extent that the Liberal trading system that began to emerge in the late-1930s
and was institutionalized in the GATT/WTO system relied on US leadership, and that
that leadership was conditional on the various reciprocal trade acts and their more modern
descendants, it is clear that administered protection played a central role in underwriting
the system as a whole. While such system-wide macro e⁄ects are purely speculative, the
generally small micro e⁄ects suggest at a minimum that we need much more information
on the way contingent protection interacts with statutory protection and multilateral
27liberalization.
28A Appendix: Country coverage
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Rep. Congo, Costa Rica, Cote
d￿ Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fin-
land, France, French Polynesia, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), Hun-
gary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Rep. Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), FYR
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Fed. Sts. Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Ni-
ger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, RB Venezuela, Vietnam, Rep. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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  Source: Zanardi (2006, figure 3) Table 1 - Pooled OLS and fixed country-pair effects estimates of antidumping initiation and other trade friction effects on bilateral exports (1948-2001)
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic
Antidunmping variables:
ADijt -0.076 -2.07 ** -0.068 -2.44 ** -0.112 -2.90 *** -0.073 -2.53 **
CADijt 0.002 0.75 0.005 1.62 0.001 0.26 0.004 1.43
Other trade frictions:
NCUijt -0.389 -4.90 *** -0.007 -0.08 -0.352 -4.21 *** -0.014 -0.14
NFTAijt 0.158 2.68 *** -0.107 -1.79 * 0.097 1.47 -0.227 -3.24 ***
ln DISTij -0.054 -8.05 *** - - -0.010 -1.21 - -
NBORDij 0.564 13.29 *** - - 0.495 11.44 *** - -
NLANGij 0.043 3.23 *** - - -0.011 -0.69 - -
Observations 294356 294356 294356 294356
Country-pairs 21450 21450 19458 19458
Joint signif. of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint signif. of multilat. resistance (p-value of F-statistic) - - 0.084 0.000
Hauman test (p-value of ⎠
2-statistic) - 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fixed country-pair effects (p-value of F-statistic) - 0.000 - 0.000
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.924 0.000
Trade friction determinants of normalized bilateral exports
Fixed country-pair effects
Ignoring multilateral resistance (untransformed trade frictions) Accounting for multilateral resistance (transformed trade frictions)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Fixed country-pair effects Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
***, **, * indicates significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. ADijt ~ number of bilateral antidumping investigations of country j against i in year t; CADijt ~ cumulative number of ADijt 
until year t; NCUijt/NFTAijt ~ absence of pair ij's membership in customs union/free trade area in year t; ln DISTij ~ great circle distance between i and j's capitals; NBORDij/NLANGij ~ absence of a
common border/language between i and j.
 Table 2 - Sensitivity analysis of the antidumping effect on normalized exports (reference is Model D in Table 1)





Reference: Model D in Table 1 -0.073 -2.53 ** 0.004 1.43
Sensitivity analyses:
   (i) Including further time-variant trade frictions
a) -0.075 -2.61 *** 0.005 1.69 *
   (ii) As in (i) plus lagged antidumping measures
b) -0.133 6.74 *** 0.011 4.31 **
   (iii) As in (ii) plus twice lagged antidumping measures
c) -0.131 3.23 ** 0.015 3.85 **
   (iv) As in (iii) plus AD and CAD of exporter
d) -0.134 3.79 ** 0.013 2.93 **
   (v) As in (iv) but accounting for systematically missing trade flows
e) -0.135 10.25 ** 0.013 8.88 **
   (vi) As in (iv) but using levels (incl. zeros) rather than the log of exports in a poisson QML model
f) -0.212 4.65 * 0.010 1.41
   (vii) As in (iv) but using impositions of AD measures instead of investigations
g) -0.107 2.34 * 0.002 0.13
   (viii) As in (iv) but using GDP-weighted rather than unweighted averages for third-country effects
h)
-0.046 -1.67 * 0.017 6.28 ***
Parameter of ADijt Parameter of CADijt
All models include fixed country-pair effects and fixed time effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. - a) Beyond the time-
variant trade frictions of Model D in Table 1, the specification icludes the following covariates: absence of WTO membership for one of the two countries; absence of WTO
membership for both countries; absence of currency union membership; absence of currency peg membership; absence of currency band membership; absence of
preferential (other than customs union of free trade area) membership. These variables are jointly significant at one percent. - b) Beyond the variables in specification (i) in
this table, we include ADij,t-1 and CADij,t-1. These variables are jointly significant at five percent. The above coefficients are the accumulated ones (i.e., of ADijt and ADij,t-1 
together, and similarly for CADijt). - c) Beyond the variables in specification (ii) in this table, we include ADij,t-2 and CADij,t-2. These variables are jointly significant at five
percent. The above coefficients are the accumulated ones (i.e., of ADijt,A D ij,t-1,a n dA D ij,t-2 together, and similarly for CADijt). - d) Beyond the variables in specification (iii) in
this table, we include the exporter's ADjit and CADjit. These variables are jointly significant at one percent. - e) We apply Wooldridge's (1995) sample selection estimator
for panel data, following the Mundlak-Chamberlain device of modelling the fixed effects by the means of the right-hand-side variables. We estimate annual selection
models using the following determinants of the indicator for non-missing/non-zero exports: all variables as in specification (iv) in this table; the means of these variables;
time-invariant geographical determinants such as common language, adjacency, log distance, log area of exporter plus importer, location on a common continent, and
their demeaned counterparts to account for multilateral resistance as in equation (12). There is a vector of inverse Mill's ratios, one for each year. The test for sample
selection relies on a model with a single Mill's ratio being made up of the annual ones (as suggested by Wooldridge, 1995). The test statistic of the latter is significant at
one percent. - f) This model follows the suggestion of Tenreyro and Santos Silva (2006) by using a quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model with robust standard errors.
We follow the Mundlak device and additionally include country-pair means of all variables in the model to account for the panel nature of the data. Since zero trade flows
are not wiped out by the logarithmic transformation, here, we cover 882,451 observations in this case. The model is nowWhile the point estimate in this model turns out to
be larger than that in (iv), the two confidence intervals overlap enough so that the parameters for AD and CAD are not significantly different between (iv) and (vi). - g) The
data are provided by Chad Bown and available only from 1980 onwards. The total number of observations is 85,052 and there are 9,744 country-pairs. Othert h a nu s i n g
impositions rather than investigations, the estimated specification is the same as that in (iv) in this table. - h) See Baier and Bergstrand (2006) for this alternative
approximation of the model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The exporter's antidumping investigations are jointly significant in this model. - i) The figures for
specifications (ii)-(vii) are F-statistics rather than t-statistcs.  Table 3A - Further results ("Global chilling effect" specifications)
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Sum of all contemporaneous investigations of country j in year t 0.090 0.90
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Sum of all contemporaneous impositions of country j in year t -0.046 -0.32
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Sum of all contemporaneous investigations of country j in year t -0.160 -1.12
   Sum of all contemporaneous impositions of country j in year t 0.111 0.56
Case 1: Using the sum of antidumping investigations of country j against all countries in year t in addition to the dyad-
by-year specific ones (in the spirit of Vandenbussche and Zanardi):
a)
Case 2: Using the sum of antidumping impositions of country j against all countries in year t in addition to the dyad-by-
year specific ones (in the spirit of Vandenbussche and Zanardi):
a)
Case 3: Using the sum of antidumping investigations and that of impositions of country j against all countries in year t
in addition to the dyad-by-year specific ones (in the spirit of Vandenbussche and Zanardi):
a)
All models include fixed country-pair effects and fixed time effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1, 5,
and 10 percent, respectively. - a) The sum of antidumping investigations and/or impositions enter(s) insignificantly
while the dyad-per-time-specific effects of AD investigations and impositions remain significant. 
 Table 3B - Further results continued (retaliation specifications)
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Retaliation dummyijt 0.204 1.27
   ADijt -0.139 3.57 **
   CADijt 0.014 3.21 **
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Retaliation dummyijt 0.040 0.67
   ADijt -0.139 3.36 **
   CADijt 0.014 3.56 **
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Retaliation dummyijt 0.026 0.16
   ADijt -0.135 3.36 **
   CADijt 0.013 2.79 **
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Retaliation dummyijt -0.011 -0.19
   ADijt -0.132 3.01 **
   CADijt 0.013 2.93 **
Variable Coef. t-statistic
   Exporter's AD-law dummy 14.743 4.5 ***
   Importer's AD-law dummy -7.422 -2.26 **
   Interaction effect of exporter and importer AD-law dummy (both apply the law) 0.023 0.72
   ADijt -0.135 3.43 **
   CADijt 0.013 2.95 **
Case 4: Using the specification as in (iii) of Table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD
investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before:
Case 5: Using the specification as in (iii) of the Table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD
investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before interacted with the number of AD
investigations:
a)
Case 6: Using the specification as in (iv) of the Table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD
investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before:
Case 8: Using the specification as in (iv) of Table 2 plus 3 dummies: AD-law adoption of exporter; AD-law adoption
of importer and the interactive term of the two. The dummies are set at 1 in any year of AD-law adoption and
thereafter:
Case 7: Using the specification as in (iv) of the Table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD
investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before interacted with the number of AD
investigations:
a)
All models include fixed country-pair effects and fixed time effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1, 5,
and 10 percent, respectively. - a) Here, the exporter's AD investigations are included as well and they enter
significantly at 1 percent. Hence, the exporter's investigations matter, but not in a way that is interrelated with the
importer's investigations as presumed in the retaliation literature. 
 
 Table 4 - Quantifying the antidumping initiation effect on export volume
(Percentage point changes of normalized exports from 1960 to 2000)
Effect on exports of all countries into Total effect
     average country-pair in the sample -0.119 -0.024
     average country-pair with violating importer in the sample -1.597 -0.575
     average country-pair with non-violating importer in the sample 0.035 0.035
Effect due to multi-
lateral resistance
The reported effects are trade-weighted averages.
 Table 5 - Descriptive statistics
Variables
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Antidumping investigations (AD)
   contemporaneous (ADijt) 0.0067 0.1515 0.0002 0.1424
   once lagged (ADij,t-1) 0.0063 0.1480 0.0003 0.1392
   twice lagged (ADij,t-2) 0.0059 0.1418 0.0003 0.1336
Cumulative antidumping investigations
   contemporaneous (CADijt) 0.0577 2.1188 0.0076 2.0497
   once lagged (CADij,t-1) 0.0522 2.0465 0.0073 1.9812
   twice lagged (CADij,t-2) 0.0490 2.0416 0.0076 1.9798
Absence of regional trade agreements
   customs unions (CUijt) 0.9956 0.0664 0.0007 0.0633
   free trade areas (FTAijt) 0.9918 0.0902 0.0003 0.0799
   other preferential trade agreements (PTAijt) 0.9836 0.1272 -0.0004 0.1081
WTO non-membership of
   one country in a pair 0.4315 0.4953 -0.0004 0.4377
   both countries in a pair 0.3460 0.4757 0.0001 0.2187
Absence of currency arrangements
   currency unions 0.9910 0.0947 0.0001 0.0356
   currency pegs 0.9628 0.1892 -0.0011 0.1665
   cureny bands 0.9926 0.0856 -0.0002 0.0791
Geographical and cultural variables
   log bilateral distance (ln DISTij) 8.7524 0.7796 -0.0053 0.6690
   absence of a common border 0.9852 0.1206 0.0013 0.1193
   absence of a common language 0.8423 0.3645 -0.0025 0.3114
Untransformed Demeaned as in Baier and 
Bergstrand (2006)
The dependent variable is the log of bilaeral exports over exporter-times-imorter GDP (mean=-46.2346; std.
dev.=2.5988). In some of the regressions, we use the non-demeaned log exporter GDP (mean=23.8455; std.
dev.=2.3315) and log importer GDP (mean=23.9068; std. dev.=2.2935) as additional control variables.
 